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Abstract 
This study examines the interplay of narrative and other factors in the rise and fall 
of the Muslim Brotherhood during the Egyptian Revolution. I hypothesize that narrative 
played a major role in the Muslim Brotherhoods rise to power, and that failure to adapt 
their narrative in the aftermath contributed to their downfall. 
Chairman Mao said, “the guerrilla must move amongst the people as a fish swims 
in the sea.” A successful narrative is an indispensable element in a successful revolution. 
Revolutionaries rely on popular support. A powerful justice narrative is the kindling 
which ignites revolutionary hearts.  Forged in the furnace of rebellion, revolutionary 
leaders tend to be charismatic figures, often with authoritarian tendencies. In the 
afterglow of successful revolution, revolutionary leaders are often loathe to change old 
habits, relying instead on old narratives and loyalists from revolutionary days. However, 
in the aftermath of revolution a fundamental change has occurred which cannot be 
masked with revolutionary slogans: outsider has become insider; rebel has become ruler. 
The pre-revolutionary narrative of struggle must evolve in order to be legitimate. A new 
narrative is required which embraces the entire nation, not merely loyal supporters. The 
new narrative must be inclusive, and offer the hope of peace and prosperity. Regimes 
whose narratives fail, who are unable to effect their will by persuasion of narrative, often 
resort to coercive authoritarianism. The most successful scenario in the aftermath of 
revolution is that leaders adapt their narrative (including policies) to the changed context 
(revolutionaries as rulers) and reform existing institutions. Historically, the failure to 
successfully adapt narrative results in instability.   
After existing on the political fringes for over 80 years, The Egyptian Muslim 
Brotherhood gained power during the Egyptian Revolution that began on 25 January 
2011, which was part of the Arab Spring and culminated with victories in parliamentary 
elections followed by the election of Muslim Brotherhood President Mohammed Morsi 
on 30 June 2012. Only a year later, on 3 July 2013 President Morsi and the Brotherhood 
were deposed by the Egyptian military, after massive public demonstrations opposing the 
Muslim Brotherhood.  
The Muslim Brotherhood were able to ascend to power in large part because of a 
credible narrative based on a long history of being one of the few national institutions to 
provide social services to orphans, widows, the sick and the poor as well as a courageous 
opponent of dictatorship for many decades. However, the heavy baggage of ideology, 
expedient alliances, and occasional cooperation with dictatorships proved to be difficult 
to reconcile after they achieved power. After rising to power, the Muslim Brotherhood 
leaders engaged in behavior and adopted policies that conflicted with their official 
narrative of tolerance and inclusiveness, which put into question not only the credibility 
of the narrative but the legitimacy of the organization itself. In the year after rising to 
political power, the Muslim Brotherhood failed to unify the country or effectively 
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manage the economy. In fairness to the Muslim Brotherhood, one year is a short period 
of time, and any other regime would have faced similar challenges. Negative 
environmental factors such as a failing economy, deteriorating social conditions, 
questions of credibility, opposition to their increasingly overt religious ideology, and 
their partisan triumphalism undermined their support.  
Other important elements contributed to the Muslim Brotherhood’s success 
during the Egyptian Revolution. The most important factor was the existence of a long 
established and well-developed national organization throughout Egypt. Narrative was 
the second most important element. The third major factor was the weakness of the 
opposition.  
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INTRODUCTION  
This study analyzes the ascent to power by the Muslim Brotherhood during the Egyptian 
Revolution beginning on 25 January 2011 through 3 July 2013 when President Mohammed 
Morsi and the Brotherhood were deposed by the Egyptian military, in the aftermath of massive 
public demonstrations. The actors and their role in in the Revolution are analyzed, with a focus 
on identifying and evaluating narratives associated with each of the actors. The role of narrative 
as well as other important factors which contributed to the Muslim Brother's victory in 
presidential and parliamentary elections are discussed, as well as the post election failure of the 
Muslim Brotherhood. 
BACKGROUND 
The Egyptian Revolution is the political upheaval that has occurred in Egypt during the 
Arab Spring, which began with the self-immolation of a fruit vendor in Tunisia in January 2011. 
The Arab Spring was a tsunami of revolutionary fervor crested by a decentralized youthful 
protest movement that spread quickly from Tunisia to Egypt, Libya and other countries. The 
toppling of long-standing dictators and their corrupt regimes generated social and political 
euphoria throughout the Middle East. Many countries held their first free democratic elections, 
bringing long-suppressed political groups to center stage. The Arab Spring in Egypt initially 
resulted in a relatively peaceful and democratic change of regime, the lifting of the widely hated 
30-year-old Emergency Law that the Mubarak regime used to repress dissent, and a post-
Mubarak Egypt in which free elections were held. Both the president and a parliamentary 
majority were members of the Muslim Brotherhood until their recent overthrow by the Egyptian 
military. 
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Two years from the onset of the Arab Spring, the optimistic views once held by most 
Egyptians are now wearing thin, and the shadow of winter and reality seems to have eclipsed the 
euphoria of spring.  Tunisia’s Islamist government has “acknowledged the prospect of civil 
war…” breaking out between Islamists and modernists (World Tribune, 2013). Chaos reigns in 
Libya. Infighting within the Libyan General National Congress and continued clashes between 
rival militias and Islamist groups threaten another revolution (Gumuchian, 2013) and a growing 
potential breeding ground for Islamic Jihadi militants (Michael, 2013). Islamist fighters pushed 
from the current conflict in Mali by foreign intervention now find themselves in Libya, 
threatening an already fragile government. Yemen is embroiled in a struggle against armed 
militant groups and is on the verge of a food crisis, and the government exerts little control 
outside the capital of Sanaa and a few other major cities (Al-Zuhayyan, 2013). The Syrian 
"revolution" has become more civil war than revolution, and is widely seen as a proxy war 
between Sunni Saudi Arabia and Shia Iran (Al-Quds, 2012).  
Ironically, the most stable countries within the region seem to fall into three categories. 
First are those ruthless dictatorships that acted decisively in the face of the Arab Spring to crush 
dissent, e.g., Saudi Arabia, Bahrain, Algeria. Second are those that bribe citizens with money, 
free food, loan interest forgiveness and other inducements to halt pro-democracy activism, e.g., 
Kuwait, United Arab Emirates. Third are those that appear to be implementing immediate 
“reforms” (the permanence of which remains in question) and making accommodations with 
other existing political parties in an effort to cling to power (Morocco, Jordan). 
In Egypt the second anniversary of the Egyptian revolution was marked with widespread 
protests and discontent with the Islamist government led by President Morsi and a parliament 
dominated by the Muslim Brotherhood. Political opposition to the Muslim Brother's persistent 
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efforts to “Islamacize” Egypt revealed an unmistakable authoritarian streak in the Islamist 
regime and produced deep fractures within Egyptian society between supporters and detractors 
of the Muslim Brotherhood. Mubarak-like dictates cementing Morsi’s word as the final authority 
in government, a perceived Brotherhoodization of the state and mass media, a worsening 
economy, along with little real positive change in day-to- day life since the departure of Mubarak 
had left many previously hopeful Egyptians jaded and disillusioned.  
The two other major actors in the Revolution, the ancien régime and the secular 
democratic youth (the Arab Street), failed to offer a credible voice. The discredited ancien 
régime was widely perceived as an artifact of the past. The disorganized secular democratic 
youth movement that sparked the revolution formed a loose opposition group (The National 
Salvation Front), but until the recent coup had been relegated to a largely background role. The 
Egyptian military severed the umbilical tie to Mubarak and returned to its barracks. Mubarak and 
many of his associates are now in prison. The military, prior to the recent coup, had professed no 
interest in taking part in the political life of Egypt unless absolutely necessary. 
The Muslim Brotherhood's narrative of Islamic charity, opposition to dictatorship, and 
Egyptian nationalism had not meaningfully changed from pre-revolutionary days. In the year 
since the Muslim Brotherhood took power, it has been obvious to everyone that day-to-day life 
has gotten significantly worse for most Egyptians. Mostafa Bakery, the chief editor of the 
Egyptian language newspaper The Week, was quoted in a blog post saying, “Every time we hear 
Morsi interviewed or giving a speech, it’s like Morsi lives in a different country, where there is 
no economic inflation and the people live in better conditions than they did under the Mubarak 
regime” (Sayed, 2013).  
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There is an essential contradiction inherent in the fundamental nature and goals of the 
Muslim Brotherhood itself. Although its rise to power was made possible by democratic 
elections, its ideology clearly tends toward an authoritarian religious state. The failure of the 
Muslim Brotherhood’s narrative to adapt to being more inclusive and meaningfully addressing 
the failing economy, continuing social justice issues, and rampant corruption eroded its 
popularity and legitimacy. It seems clear that in the weeks before the military coup the 
Brotherhood had already reached the critical point, which cognitive linguist George Lakoff refers 
to as “breaking the frame” (Fora.tv, 2008), a point at which a narrative has become so detached 
from observable reality (the context) that it loses much of its credibility and legitimacy. 
RESEARCH QUESTION 
Was narrative an important factor in the rise and fall of the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt during 
the Egyptian Revolution?  
THEORY 
In politics, frames are part of competing moral systems that are used in political 
discourse and in charting political action. In short, framing is a moral enterprise: it 
says what the character of a movement is.  All politics are moral. Political figures 
and movements always make policy recommendations claiming they are the right 
things to do. No political figure ever says, ‘Do what I say because it’s wrong! Or 
because it doesn’t matter!’ Some moral principles or other lie behind every 
political policy agenda. (Lakoff, 2010) 
 
Many analysts conclude that demographics or structural factors such as unemployment 
rates among youth and college graduates, poverty, and other factors played a major role (for 
example, LaGraffe, 2012 and Korotayev, 2012) in the Egyptian Revolution. However, as Lakoff 
and other social scientists remind us, statistics are not the language of the human psyche. 
William James pointed out that although emotions are merely chemical changes in the body 
(Prinz, 2003), chemistry fails to explain social movements or revolutions. There is a consensus 
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among cognitive linguists such as Lakoff and Steven Pinker -- who hail from different corners in 
the so-called Linguistic Wars -- that logical reasoning is often not very logical at all. Morality 
involves emotion. "All politics is moral," Lakoff tells us. Human moral judgments, especially 
social and political behavior, are informed by emotion (Prinz, 2003). Human thought, including 
reasoning, is based on associations and metaphors in the subconscious mind. According to 
Lakoff, human thought is at its root a collection of metaphors. The process of cognition takes 
place mostly in the subconscious mind, based on constructions of metaphor. The thinking 
processes of both reasoning and emotion essentially boil down to complex networks of analogy 
(Lakoff, 1980). 
In order to better understand the Egyptian Revolution -- why and how it began, and how 
it progressed -- the cultural, historical and psychological influences on the actors must be 
considered in context. The unique contribution of this analysis is to consider the pervasive 
influences of sub-textual framing and narrative that often were not explicitly discussed or 
explicitly articulated by the actors themselves. 
This research draws heavily on the cross-disciplinary work of George Lakoff in narrative 
and framing, as well as other sociological perspectives. Content analysis is used to identify 
themes in open source media, while discourse analysis is used to identify and analyze the 
narratives of the major actors. A successful political movement or political actor requires a 
worldview narrative that is embraced by his target audience. Public opinion and other research 
shows that most people are heavily influenced in their political views by elites, i.e., a 
leader/leaders or primary group they trust (Entman, 2004 and Bernays, 2005). Narratives such as 
advertising slogans reduce complexity (and eliminate the work and expertise needed) of fact-
finding and analysis on the part of the individual follower. The follower trusts the leader to 
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interpret and explain things in summary form, along with action recommendations compatible 
with the follower's worldview. Followers usually acquire their social, religious and political 
worldviews ("narratives") from the people they accept as leaders. In early life leaders are usually 
parents and older members of the family. In the political realm leaders are politicians, religious 
figures and others who explain and organize the world into narratives. An example is a visit to 
the doctor. The doctor is a trusted authority figure and has expertise and access to authoritative 
data which enable conclusions and action recommendations that can be trusted. The act of trust, 
which may be at the outset rational in nature, often becomes faith. Once trust is achieved, 
followers are thereafter willing to overlook factual inconsistencies and incompatible behavior 
(Hoffer, 2002). 
Public debate is comprised of both logical and emotional elements. Dialectic elements 
have to do with facts, logic, and theory, while narrative elements deal in metaphor, emotion, and 
cliché (Montanye, 2005). The advertising industry understands that consumer likes and dislikes 
of products ("products" include issues and candidates in a political campaign) are often 
influenced by factors such as emotional response, self-image, sexual desire, fear, and 
metaphorical association. Edward Bernays, "the father of public relations" (a nephew of 
Sigmund Freud), pioneered the use of psychological principles on Madison Avenue. Bernays 
believed that people could be, and often were manipulated. "Those who manipulate [the habits 
and opinions of the masses]...constitute an invisible government which is the true ruling power 
of our country" (Stromberg, 2010). Bernays put his theories into practice, demonstrating the 
power of psychology in manipulating perception throughout a long career on Madison Avenue. 
A large part of the political opinion-forming process is based on emotion, evoked by 
cultural context and metaphor. Perception of issues involves filtering, emotion, framing, value-
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shifting, metaphor, and cognitive processes other than mere syllogistic reasoning. This is 
especially true of opinions relating to politics. George Lakoff, Eric Hoffer, Shanto Iyengar, 
James Montagye and other researchers have established the need to integrate political opinions 
into a larger matrix of values. Lakoff, a cognitive linguist inspired by the concept of framing first 
advanced by Erving Goffman, believes that a person's perception and the person's opinions are 
heavily influenced by the person's personality. Iyengar (2005) has defined political or economic 
"framing" as "principled rhetoric: overarching philosophy of governance."  
The pre-revolutionary narrative of the Muslim Brotherhood was the story of its own long 
history as a provider of social welfare and health services to the poor and an honest and 
courageous opponent of dictatorship. The overarching frame in the Muslim Brotherhood's 
narrative is essentially that of trustworthiness: "The Muslim Brotherhood has the best interests of 
Egypt and its people at heart. You can trust us. We have earned trust based on our long history."  
This powerful narrative was a significant factor in allowing the Muslim Brotherhood to influence 
and mobilize public opinion, allowing them to ultimately seize political power in Egypt. Their 
failure to effectively adapt their narrative was instrumental in their downfall.  
Human beings communicate by telling stories (Lakoff, 1980). A story comprises a 
sequence of ideas, events, and scenes. Frames are the lens of a camera, capturing the way 
humans feel about ideas, events and each other. Narrative is a story outlined in frames. It is an 
ever-present element in politics, because there is no politics without narrative. Former U.S. 
Speaker of the House of Representatives Tip O'Neal famously said that "all politics is local.” In 
fact, every construct of society and politics is at its heart local, comprised of interactions among 
individual human beings. The effectiveness of narrative boils down to three primary 
characteristics:  
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1-     A leader or group trusted by the audience 
2-     A narrative rooted in a cultural context and world-view accepted by the audience 
3-     Credibility and believability  
Understanding the elements of successful narrative is an important tool for policymakers in 
crafting effective public communication and, of course, in helping to avoid mistakes that may 
cause narratives to fail. 
To determine the criteria used to identify and evaluate narratives, I drew on elements of 
Lakoff's (1980, 1987, 1989, 1999, 2006, 2009) metaphor and framing paradigm. Major themes of 
the Arab Spring were identified and analyzed in terms of frame, metaphors, emotional language, 
cultural symbols, and filtering. Each of these elements contributed to the overall dominant 
narrative. Metaphors are at the root of human cognition and emotion. Emotional language can be 
used to shape and predispose a reader towards a specific opinion. Cultural symbols are the source 
of the strongest emotions and group affiliations that people can experience. Filtering, in 
particular omission, is as important as commission, because what people do not know can 
influence perception just as much as what they do know. 
The use of framing, narrative and language choice heavily influences public perception of 
individuals, issues and events. One may think of "frames" as a series of scenes in a film. Framing 
refers to the method by which information is presented in such a way as to encourage certain 
interpretations and discourage others, offering an “organizing idea or story line that provides 
meaning” to events related to an issue (Zhongdang, 1993). Narrative is the story of the film taken 
as a whole: the overall storyline and its meaning, comprising a sequence of events/frames.  
As in the case of opinion poll results, a reader's perception of headlines can depend on 
framing. Lakoff's analysis indicates that huge opinion shifts to diametrically opposite stances on 
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issues can occur, depending on how a question was framed (Lakoff, 2011). The framing of a 
narrative can heavily influence the perception of an issue, often with little relationship to the 
factual content.   
"Value shifting" (or bi-conceptualism) is the change caused in a subject's opinion 
formation by varying the wording of narratives and questions (Lakoff, 2009). "Value shifting" 
refers to the ability of a person to hold contradictory world-views on different issues (Lakoff, 
2009). Management of perception using value shifting is a traditional manipulation technique. 
Value shifting can be used to manipulate headlines to present a news story in a sympathetic or 
unsympathetic frame. An example is the directive by a Fox News manager to reporters requiring 
the use of emotionally laden words such as "government option" and "homicide bomber" in 
place of more commonly used "public option" (referring to health care) and "suicide bomber" 
(Dimiero, 2010). It is well understood that in response to alternative phrasing, i.e., framing, of 
questions ("word asymmetry"), voters may change their votes or poll answers. Word choice and 
phrasing often have associations relating to emotions and group identity. Daniel Rugg tested 
alternative wording for logically identical questions and found that respondents varied as much 
as 17% in their answers (Reuband, 2003). Filtering (failure to provide alternative choices) 
exaggerates the effect of emotionally charged framing. In his analysis of a recent California poll, 
Lakoff (2010) emphasized the broader significance of this phenomenon: “It was noteworthy not 
just because of the size of the framing shift on the main question, but because the shift was 
systematic. Roughly, around 18 percent of voters showed that their values are not fixed. They 
think BOTH like liberals and conservatives — depending on how they understand the issue. 
With a liberal value-framing, they give liberal answers; with a conservative value-framing, they 
give conservative answers.” 
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A famous example of the conscious use of framing and narrative to change human 
behavior is the marketing campaign conceived by Edward Bernays at the behest of a major 
tobacco company. In the 1920s cigarette smoking by females was considered a taboo subject and 
the only women thought to smoke were those of “loose morals” and questionable integrity. 
Seeking profit from the untapped female market, the American Tobacco Company enlisted 
Bernays to change this state of affairs. By framing cigarettes as symbols of gender equality 
(Torches of Freedom) he was able to convince American women that the action of smoking was 
an act of female emancipation in a male-dominated world and liberation from an absurd taboo 
(Bernays, 2005).  
Lakoff has extensively analyzed the role that ideas play in influencing political and social 
movements. “In the ‘marketplace of ideas’ theory, that (sic) the best factually based logical 
argument will always win. But this doesn’t actually happen” (Bekker, 2011). The cliché of a 
Darwinian marketplace of ideas in which the best ideas win on their own merits and reasoned 
logical decisions made by people is a myth. 
Revolutionaries 
Isaac Newton pointed out that his work was made possible because he stood on the 
shoulder of giants. Like Newton, revolutionaries are bound to the past and their philosophies and 
policies are influenced by the regime they replace. Revolutionaries may be willing to sacrifice 
their life to the cause, but are often unwilling to sacrifice their old narratives. It could be argued 
that post-revolutionary states like China would have prospered far more greatly in the long term 
had Chairman Mao died in 1949 upon the establishment of the People’s Republic of China. 
Revolutionary leaders are often loathe to change old habits, relying instead on old narratives and 
old comrades from revolutionary days. Victorious revolutionaries often wind up inheriting 
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institutions rather than rebuilding them. However, a fundamental change has occurred which 
cannot be masked with revolutionary slogans: outsider has become insider; rebel has become 
ruler. The pre-revolutionary narrative of struggle must evolve in order to remain legitimate and 
must appeal to a wider audience. A new narrative is required which must address the entire 
nation, not merely loyal supporters. Further, the inherited institutions of the ancien régime wind 
up influencing the character of the regime that replaces it. Inherited institutions are one of the 
most important elements which determine context. Revolutionaries often exercise power through 
institutions which very much resemble the regimes they replaced (Geddes, 2010).  
A post-revolutionary narrative must be inclusive, and offer the prospect of peace and 
prosperity. Regimes whose narratives fail, that is, regimes that are unable to effect their will by 
persuasion of narrative, often resort to coercive authoritarianism. The most successful scenario in 
the aftermath of revolution is for leaders to adapt their narratives (policies) to the changed 
context (revolutionaries as rulers), while rebuilding institutions. Historically, the failure to 
successfully adapt narrative results in a loss of credibility and legitimacy, leading to strife and 
instability.    
Narrative And Context 
 There is a balance between narrative and context. Context is the total environment, 
including institutions, politics, economics and social dynamics, in which the narrative takes 
place. Neither narrative nor context exists in isolation. The context from which the narrative 
plays out is extremely important. If the context is incompatible with the narrative, there will be a 
loss of credibility, hence a loss of legitimacy. To illustrate the relationship between narrative and 
context, the table below lists the three most common basic typologies of the patterns of 
revolutionary narrative that present post-revolutionary outcomes, i.e., degree of regime stability.  
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Figure	  1.	  Ideal	  Post-­‐Revolutionary	  Outcome,	  adaptation	  of	  narrative	  to	  post-­‐revolutionary/new	  context 
Figure 1 represents what would be the ideal post-revolutionary outcome, where the 
revolutionaries adapt their narrative, in other words polices, worldview, etc., in order to 
effectively govern. An example is the change from an apartheid system to multi-racial 
democracy in South Africa. The African National Congress (ANC) was the primary opponent of 
the South African government and played an instrumental role in conducting negotiations with 
President de Klerk, the leader of the National Party. Nelson Mandela and other ANC leaders 
were able to legitimize the ANC as a political party, enact reforms, end apartheid and ultimately 
seize the political leadership of the country in 1994, a position they still retain today. The ANC 
understood that once they were in power, if they wanted to continue to remain in power within a 
multiparty democratic system, they had to expand and adjust their narrative to be more 
encompassing of a broader audience, including whites. The Muslim Brotherhood could have 
 
	   13	  
followed a similar strategy by adjusting its narrative to be more inclusive of out-groups like the 
secular democratic youth.  
Another example of ideal post-revolutionary outcome is the Socialist Republic of 
Vietnam. Following the Fall of Saigon and the successful reunification of Vietnam by the North 
Vietnamese in 1976, the victors dismantled the old institutions of the South Vietnamese regime.  
In the case of Vietnam, revolutionaries had achieved a clear-cut military victory and were able to 
impose their will on the losing South Vietnamese. The ANC, in contrast, negotiated a peaceful 
transition with the de Klerk regime. The ANC adapted its narrative as progress was made in 
negotiating the peaceful transfer of power, where neither party was able to dictate terms. The 
senior leadership of both the ANC and the Vietnamese tended to be elderly, set in their habits 
and worldview, with little formal education. Unlike the ANC, the North Vietnamese unified the 
country after winning a war. They held absolute power and were free to impose their will on the 
defeated South Vietnamese. Feeling invincible, the North Vietnamese leadership maintained a 
doctrinaire socialist narrative for years after their victory, refusing to adapt their old narrative to 
the radically changing context of a capitalist, technologically advancing world. The Vietnamese 
economy collapsed, abortive rebellions occurred in several provinces, and the Vietnamese 
leadership remained obstinately opposed to reform until 1986, when the policy changed at a 
national party conference. In 1986, adapting their narrative to a worsening domestic context (a 
sluggish economy and a largely rural based population), the socialist government embarked on a 
program of economic reforms. The Đổi Mới program (new change program) allowed for 
privately owned enterprises, market-like reforms, economic liberalizations and other aspects of 
capitalism into the country. These liberalizations continue up to this day and have been 
extraordinarily successful in economic development and maintenance of political stability. 
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Vietnam is considered to be a new “Asian tiger.” These divergent narratives pursued by the 
victorious revolutionaries in South Africa and Vietnam illustrate the importance of adapting 
narrative and the reciprocal influences of narrative on context and context on narrative. 
	  
Figure	  2.	  Complete	  failure	  of	  narrative	  to	  adapt	  to	  changes	  in	  context 
Figure 2 represents the case where pre-revolutionary narrative fails to adapt to changes in 
context. Ruling parties are forced to use increasingly more coercive measures to prop up an 
increasingly illegitimate narrative to maintain power. Cuba is a classic case, where the Castro 
regime imposed increasingly authoritarian means to maintain power. The recent fall of the 
Muslim Brotherhood belongs in this category. The narrative that worked so successfully during 
the Muslim Brotherhood’s ascension to power no longer fits the context in the post-election 
phase. This loss of popular support enabled the military coup. 
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Figure	  3.	  Partial	  unsuccessful	  adaption	  of	  narrative	  to	  changes	  in	  context 
Figure 3 represents the case where a change in context required an adaptation in 
narrative, but where the change has been unsuccessful. Turkey would seem to be a recent 
example of this typology. The Justice and Development Islamic party (AKP), which has now 
been in power for over ten years, was brought into power by an electorate with a large secular 
component who were voting for an end to corruption and effective management of the economy. 
However, recent demonstrations in Turkey have shown that the large secular portion of the 
electorate now believes that the AKP and Prime Minister Erdogan have demonstrated 
authoritarian tendencies endangering Turkey’s secular traditions. The narrative of honest and 
good business management and promises of religious freedom is increasingly less credible in the 
face of the current repression of dissent. A better solution (narrative) for Turkey would be to 
adopt more tolerant and inclusive responses to protests. The alternative is increased authoritarian 
measures as we are seeing now. 
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Social Identity  
Social Identity Theory is based on the human need to join groups. Group affiliation, or 
more usually multi-group affiliation, is an important aspect of a person's identity. Once an 
individual has affiliated with a group, adherence to group norms enhances self-esteem of both 
individual and group, with conforming "identity-infused behaviors." Lack of adherence has the 
opposite effect. People tend to avoid out-group behaviors. Violation of group norms risks 
ostracism. For example, a study found that minorities avoided healthy food to avoid participating 
in "white" out-group behavior (Burnaford, 2012). Clearly, social and political protest and dissent 
may violate in-group norms and run the risk of family and other in-group conflict, or ostracism. 
Zaller also observes that political opinions are much more stable among knowledgeable 
people. Interestingly, this is not true of those who are merely "highly interested" (Zaller, 1992). 
This implies that support by traditional Egyptians for trusted institutions and organizations such 
as the Muslim Brotherhood is likely to be much more stable than for leaderless ad-hoc protest 
groups. This also implies that many Egyptians who were not already knowledgeable on political 
issues, but who became caught up in the fervor of the revolution, would not having much staying 
power in continuing to support protestors as a persistent political movement.  
People tend to acquire their political and social beliefs from trusted individuals within 
their groups. In early life such leaders are parents and older relatives. Upon reaching adulthood, 
people may be influenced by leaders ranging from mullahs to generals to the president of the 
country. In the social and political context, "cueing messages" from leaders are used to 
encourage in-group members to adopt group policies or perform in-group behavior (Zaller, 
1992). In return, in-group members expect privileges or patriarchal patronage.  
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Technology 
Electronic networking is important in today's world. Social media such as Facebook 
played an important messaging role in sparking the Arab Spring. In the 1980s sociologist Manuel 
Castells predicted that the elimination of space and time through electronic social networking 
would transform politics and society. The inability of Egypt's ancien régime to cope with self-
organizing dissent, using social media to communicate subversive narratives, is a good example. 
However, without organizational scaffolding, narratives that rely on electronic social media are 
likely to be ephemeral (Castells, 2004). 
Creating A Successful Narrative 
Creating a successful narrative usually begins with messaging from a trusted leader or 
group that frames issues in accord with the follower's world-view. If the history, character, role 
or behavior of the actor is so obviously in conflict with the narrative that narrative dissonance 
cannot be overcome, the narrative fails. Erstwhile followers may perceive such an actor to be 
incredible, dishonest, or even clownish. For example, Mubarak’s regime attempted to reposition 
itself using the narrative, "We've changed!," although the observable behavior of the regime 
demonstrated very little actual change. Hence, the narrative failed and the claims of change were 
perceived as buffoonish lies.   
Evaluating Narrative 
One of the primary hurdles when evaluating narratives is the chicken or the egg problem. 
Did narrative influence the outcome or did outcome write the narrative? How do we evaluate the 
role that narrative played in legitimizing the Muslim Brotherhood and mobilizing public opinion 
to its side? Narrative will always play a role in social movements, but is inevitably intertwined 
with other elements. For example, the long history of opposition and social welfare services is a 
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very important legitimizing factor for the Muslim Brotherhood. That history is mediated through 
language in the form of narrative.  Successful manipulation of narrative does not guarantee a 
particular outcome, but increases the chances of a successful outcome. The power of narrative is 
especially observable during times of crisis, where the masses look to a group or leader for a 
solution. In contrast, after the transition from revolutionary to ruler, old historical narrative may 
become somewhat of an albatross around the neck of a revolutionary opposition party which 
suddenly finds itself trying to unite an entire country. The Muslim Brotherhood has struggled 
with trying to explain inconsistent narratives. This is often a challenge for leaders and groups 
who in the past have never been forced to explain or cope with contradictory statements.  
When Is Narrative Most Important? 
Narrative is most important at times when people are most emotional. As normality 
begins to return, other factors, such as employment, trash collection and keeping criminals off 
the streets tend to overshadow narrative. In other words, the evaluation of narrative must 
consider timing and context. In some contexts, such as the first days of the Egyptian Revolution, 
narrative was perhaps the most important element of all -- the spark. The case of Egypt shows 
that the influence of narrative waxes and wanes, depending on context. The narrative of the 
secular democratic youth was the most important factor in sparking the revolution, but was less 
effective in actually turning out voters and generating long-term support than was the party 
machine of the Muslim Brotherhood. At other stages other factors, such as organizational 
presence and the ability to turn out millions of members to vote, were the most important. The 
evolution of this research has recognized the need to incorporate other theoretical approaches to 
integrate the lens of narrative in a more holistic view of the dynamics of social change. 
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RESEARCH METHODOLOGY 
The methodology used for this study was content analysis of mass news media, blog 
posts, other scholarly articles, as well as original research identifying themes in news comments 
and a meta-analysis of Egyptian news media. The analysis of comments involved collection of 
data by performing a two-level analysis on randomly selected comments in Arabic of articles 
appearing in Al-Jazeera and Al-Ahram at critical points during the Egyptian Revolution. 
Discourse tracing “extends and complements…qualitative research” (LeGreco, 2009) by pulling 
elements from many different fields and approaches, in this case a two-level approach (content 
and discourse analysis). Elements of this method were used by Ackleson (2005) in an analysis of 
security on the U.S.-Mexico border; in Skocpol’s comparative analysis of the revolutions in 
Russia, China, and France (1979), describing patterns of relationships among structures; and by 
Collier and Collier in tracing the labor movements in Latin America (LeGreco, 1991).  
Subjects Of Analysis And Analytical Model    
The subjects of analysis are the Egyptian Revolution and its major actors, the Muslim 
Brotherhood, the secular democratic youth movement (the Arab Street) and the Mubarak régime. 
The primary theoretical perspective used in analysis is George Lakoff’s work on narrative and 
discourse. Each of the actors in the Egyptian Revolution used distinctive narratives to mobilize 
public opinion.  
Potential Sources Of Error 
The volume of blog posts, tweets, texts, and social and other electronic media was far too 
great to be fully analyzed within the scope of this research project. Another potential issue 
mentioned previously is the chicken or egg problem. Is the actor successful due to the narrative 
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or is narrative successful because of the actor? In reality, these factors are co-variable. The 
solution to this problem for this particular research was to identify the elements of a successful 
narrative and apply those criteria to the narrative actually used by the Muslim Brotherhood and 
other actors during the revolution. 
One other issue with this research is that, as a non-Egyptian writing on fundamental 
Egyptian perspectives and conceptions, there always exists the danger of falling into what 
Edward Said referred to as “the orientalist mindset,” i.e., inadvertently ascribing meaning and 
reasons based upon foreign ideas, culture, and false assumptions about Egypt and Egyptians. 
Using Arabic language texts and querying native Egyptians on these ideas served to minimize 
this bias. 
THE ARAB SPRING AS NARRATIVE  
The phrase “Arab Spring” does not mean the same thing to Egyptians as it does to 
Westerners. When conducting a content analysis of news articles and comments, it quickly 
became apparent that Egyptians do not often use the term Arab Spring, except as a literal 
translation when mentioning source articles from outside the Middle East. Rather, they refer to it 
as the "25 January Revolution," the "Egyptian Revolution," the "Day of Rage," and the "People’s 
Revolution." The term “Arab Spring” is a Western construct, having an historical subtext and 
implicit world-view that underlies the term: “The use of the term ‘Spring,’ with its typically 
European connotations and inherent secular expectations, coupled with the exaggerated media 
focus on the almost mythological qualities and influence of Facebook and Twitter, fostered such 
a false universal paradigm of uniformity between the Middle East and the West” (Susser, 2012). 
This biased narrative has caused many Westerners to misapprehend the “pious” nature of 
so-called Middle Eastern societies and overestimate the power of modern technology such as 
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twitter and other social media. Mere technology cannot fundamentally transform deeply rooted 
cultural structures. “It is quite common to hear high officials in Washington and elsewhere speak 
of changing the map of the Middle East, as if ancient societies and myriad peoples can be shaken 
up like so many peanuts in a jar” (Said, 2003). 
Ironically, the metaphor of the Arab Spring has proven to be a more powerful narrative in 
the West than among Arabs. The Western idea driving the narrative of the Arab Spring was 
democracy, equality, modernity and individual freedom achieved by the Arab Street rising up 
against dictatorship. In fact, it is likely that only a minority of people living in the Middle East 
really understand or even value the Western conceptions of constitutional democracy, individual 
rights, and freedoms. Adham Hashish, a former law lecturer from Alexandria University in 
Egypt, explained that the difference is that Egyptians understand the concept of democracy 
fundamentally as a form of procedure, but their substantive view of democracy involves 
fundamental ideological differences from the West.1 The West has commercialized the idea of 
democracy, freedom and modernity. It is an export product. More generally, there is a failure to 
realize that the world-view of free markets, modernity, morality, and unrestricted individual 
rights is perceived very much like a product being marketed to the rest of the world, along with 
Western technology. 
During the tumultuous days of the Egyptian Revolution, Iman Bakri, a noted female 
Egyptian poet once known for her romantic verse and later for her cutting criticisms of Hosni 
Mubarak’s regime in political verse, wrote the piece “Mulukhiyah” in colloquial Egyptian about 
democracy.2 The poem is at the same time sarcastic and admiring of democracy, confusing the 
idea as some sort of food item as well as a goal: 
Demorcacy (sic)…Demorcacy (sic), A word that would never come to someone’s mind. 
And I swear “Abd El-Aal” it’s an insult! 
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Try to understand…Democracy, Democratic 
It’s related to “Kabab” from the Kabab Shop 
Excerpts from “Mulukhiyah” (Bakri, 2011) 
 
The lack of a substantive number of comments concerning democracy is telling. 
Egyptians seemed more concerned with issues of state corruption, justice, police brutality, state 
oppression, unemployment and lack of opportunity in the days of the Egyptian Revolution. This 
is echoed by a previous study conducted by Hamdy and Gomaa (2012). While their research 
focused on content analysis of newspapers and social media,3 none of the top reasons identified 
as inciting the protests were related to the issue of democracy.4 The apparent focus on 
Westernized ideals of democracy on the part of the secular democratic youth failed to win 
widespread support and allowed both the Mubarak regime and Islamists to label the secular 
democratic youth movement as potential traitors manipulated by sinister foreign elements. 
Lakoff emphasizes that a successful narrative needs to be grounded in the moral and 
cultural traditions of a group, which helps explain the fundamental weakness of the secular 
democratic youth movement’s narrative. Canned notions of gender equality, free press, free 
speech and other democratic notions, while understood in concept, do not necessarily resonate 
with the common Egyptian. The Muslim Brotherhood and the Mubarak regime successfully 
framed the secular democratic youth as "foreign" and elitist. Conflicting notions of identity and 
narrative caused ongoing disagreement within the secular democratic youth and explains their 
difficulty in mobilizing and lack of agreement on policy and leadership. 
THE ACTORS 
Mubarak Regime 
The primary narrative of the Mubarak regime was to purvey fear of the unknown (“the 
devil you know is better than the devil you don't know”), coupled with what was at first a heroic 
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cult of personality that transitioned over time to a patriarchal cult of personality (Ezzat, 2011), 
“Your duty is to trust and obey your father”.  
Hosni Mubarak unexpectedly became President of Egypt with the assassination of Anwar 
Sadat in 1981. While a competent Air Force officer, he was a neophyte, lacking knowledge and 
skill in the game of politics (Ezzat, 2011). He was initially expected to hold the position of 
president for one year. With a core of his trusted cadre, the one-year transitional period lasted 
thirty years, ending with the advent of the Arab Spring and the 25 January Egyptian Revolution. 
The fall of Hosni Mubarak marked the end of one of the longest standing authoritarian regimes 
in the Middle East. 
During his reign Mubarak was able to shape a personal narrative that weathered interior 
economic and political strife, repeated assassination attempts, and the volatile political activities 
of the Middle East and North Africa. Like most authoritarian regimes, a part of Mubarak’s 
longevity lies in the fact that he created and maintained a large system of security (police and 
state security) and curried the favor of the Egyptian Armed Forces to protect his interests and 
crush dissent. He also formed a large system of patronage within the police and army, presenting 
retiring officers with the police posts in the government, while retiring military officers were 
awarded positions within the private sector (Tadroz, 2012). Just as important, he fashioned a link 
in the “ordinary conceptual systems” (Lakoff, 1980) of Egyptians between himself and the nation 
of Egypt. He created the metaphoric idea that, “Mubarak is Egypt and Egypt is Mubarak.” Thus, 
for anyone to question or dissent against Mubarak was to be anti-Egypt and anti-Egyptian.  
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Figure 4. Mubarak's name in Arabic in the middle of the heart with the letters spelling "Egypt" outside the 
heart 
 
Much like the Pharaohs of ancient Egypt, Mubarak consciously strove to make a home in 
the hearts of Egyptians (Ezzat, 2011) by continually imprinting himself upon their 
consciousness. His visage was prominently displayed upon every government building 
throughout Egypt, his family name “christening” roads and public works projects. As of the 
ouster of Mubarak, there were 4600 schools, 400 hospitals/health clinics, 450 housing projects, 
300 villages, 90 research centers, 180 agricultural projects, 6000 meeting halls, and 460 roads 
and stations, totaling over 9600 separate entities bearing the name of Mubarak (Ezzat, 2011).  
Like all dynastic families, in his later years Mubarak’s main objective was to perpetuate 
his line. To this end, he groomed his son to assume the reins of the country by creating a 
nongovernmental organization (Future Generation Foundation) to jump start his son’s 
burgeoning political career and amending an article within the constitution to allow his son to 
become the only eligible candidate for the position of President (Ezzat, 2011). 
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In a bid to retain the narrative of a virile protector of Egypt, the elderly Mubarak created 
the “cult of hair dye” (Ezzat, 2011), receiving weekly visits from his hair stylist to re-dye his hair 
a jet black. His fetishism for black hair filtered down to many of his aged cabinet ministers, who 
also sported jet-black manes of hair, and subsequently down to other members of Mubarak’s 
National Democratic Party.  
Mubarak also used song and television media to strengthen the “Mubarak is Egypt” 
metaphor. There are hundreds of songs written by prominent lyricists (see “From The October 
Celebration” as an example) during Mubarak’s reign, singing his praises and expressing the 
appreciation that all should have for his stewardship of the country. Invariably the songs are 
nationalistic and feature three prominent themes: Egypt, the Egyptian government, and President 
Hosni Mubarak (Ezzat, 2011). 
Printed booklets from the government advocate the close connection of Mubarak to 
Egypt and his role of protector, with such titles as “Mubarak in the Heart of Egypt,” “Mubarak 
and Humane Governance,” “On Mubarak: The Intellectual and The Senior” and “The 
Phenomenon of Terrorism in the words of Mubarak” (Alexandria Library Digital Assets 
Repository, 2012). Manipulation of mass media presents the idea of Mubarak as the one and only 
leader.  
The famous photograph that ran in the state-run Egyptian newspaper Al-Ahram of 
Mubarak appearing to head a procession of prominent statesmen, including President Obama, 
Prime Minister Netanyahu, King Abdullah and President Mahmoud Abbas, was photoshopped. 
The original depicted Obama leading the delegation, rather than Mubarak (Four and Six, 2010). 
When confronted with the alteration of the photograph, then editor-in chief Osama Sareya 
compared the photograph to an expressionist piece of art, “a brief, live and true expression of the 
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prominent stance of President Mubarak in the Palestinian issue, his unique role in leading it 
before Washington or any other” (Four and Six, 2010). 
 
Figure 5. (L) Altered photo with Mubarak leading versus (R) original photo with Obama leading and 
Mubarak on far left 
	  
Though Mubarak had the full weight of both his security services and the Army behind 
him, he was nevertheless unable to stem the tide of revolution. Why? Consider that over 70% of 
Egypt’s population is less than 30 years old, and 90% of those under 30 are unemployed 
(Buchen, 2011 and Egypt, 2013).  Mubarak’s narrative of heroism against Israel during the 
October War of 1973 was no longer relevant or even remembered by much of the population, 
and his patriarchal narrative only resonated with those of the elder generation, while the younger 
generation mocked, albeit quietly, the octogenarians quest for youthful hair and other 
eccentricities (Ezzat, 2011). The general mood of hopelessness for the future held by Egyptian 
youth, a barely suppressed hatred of oppressive and brutal security forces, further engendered by 
the vicious public beating death of Egyptian youth Khaled Mohamed Saeed, and the recent fall 
of Bin Ali during the Tunisian Arab Spring all contributed to a counter-narrative of revolution. 
What Did Mubarak Say? 
Mubarak, at times seemingly unaware of the revolutionary momentum being generated in 
Tahrir Square and hundreds of other public spaces in Egypt, was unable to adapt his narrative. 
 
	   27	  
Attempts at both belatedly reshuffling and firing cabinet members, appointing a vice president, 
and promising not to run again in the upcoming presidential elections were all unable to mollify 
protestors. In his final speech Mubarak reverted to patriarchy, the archetypal frame of dictators 
throughout history: “A father’s dialogue with his sons and daughters…My sons, the youth of 
Egypt, brother citizen…The current moment is not to do with myself, it is not to do with Hosni 
Mubarak, but is to do with Egypt, its present and the future of its children. All Egyptians are in 
one trench now…” (“Egypt Unrest…”, 2011), and his hero frame: “I have spent a lifetime 
defending (Egypt’s) soil and sovereignty…I faced death many times…I never succumbed to 
foreign pressure or dictations…I never sought power or fake popularity. I trust that the 
overwhelming majority of the people know who Hosni Mubarak is. It pains me to see how some 
of my countrymen are treating me today” (“Egypt Unrest…”, 2011). 
His speech failed to placate the masses. The majority of Egyptians wanted Mubarak 
gone. The context had changed, but Mubarak’s narrative had not. Continuing to offer the 
narrative of the patriarchal/authoritarian father not only was no longer credible, but it also 
angered Egyptians to the point that they invoked the grave symbol of insult in Arab culture, the 
brandishing of the shoe. The foot is the lowest part of the body. The shoe is in constant contact 
with dirt, debris and detritus. To thrust or hurl a shoe towards someone suggests that person is 
even lower than the shoe and the garbage it treads through. Many removed their shoes and threw 
them or held them aloft, sole first, at Mubarak’s visage to display their anger for the President’s 
empty platitudes. He did not offer credible reforms, nor did he take responsibility for his actions; 
he was no longer a credible leader. With the dispersal and desertion of the police and security 
forces along with weakening support from the Army, he could not physically force Egyptians 
back to their homes under threat of violence. 
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Figure 6. Angry Egyptians wave their shoes after Mubarak's last speech on Feb. 10, 2011 
 
Certainly narrative was not the only factor in Mubarak’s expulsion; crippling 
unemployment, lack of opportunity, increasing staple prices, hatred of the regime, and threats to 
the stability of everyday life factored into this volatile mix as well. One may speculate that the 
outcome could have been different had Mubarak made immediate reforms like his counterparts, 
King Mohammed of Morocco or King Abdullah of Jordan, who both avoided ouster based on 
quick action and perceived royal reform by citizens. 
The “Arab Street” 
The phrase "Arab Street" refers, generally, to popular opinion in the Arab World. 
Examining the phrase more carefully, there are multiple levels of meaning hidden in the term. 
There is the suggestion of a rift in society -- a divide between ordinary people and elites. The 
people of the Arab Street live and work at mundane jobs, far removed in both street and status 
from privileged elites and royalty, who live in luxury and far removed from the noisy abodes of 
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the common people. The term also evokes a sense of resentment against inequality, double 
standards of justice and law, and the ongoing struggle in earning a living, a sense of 
powerlessness, of ordinary people standing outside and looking through gates at the world of the 
rich and powerful. The word "street" implies an essentially urban context, illustrated by one 
commentator saying traditional wisdom is that Egyptians do not revolt because "Farmers require 
stability and patience to tend their land" (Baoumi, 2011).  
In Western media the term is often used generally to refer to widespread public opinion 
in the Arab world. In the Arab context, however, there is additional subtext: the implication of 
the ever-present and potentially explosive force of popular rebellion against elite rule. The cliché 
is that Arab dictators fear the Arab Street. In reality, Arab regimes have, up until the time of the 
Arab Spring, been able to lead and manage popular opinion. In truth, the Arab Street is much like 
common people everywhere -- citizens adopt and share conventional opinions molded by 
leaders, mass media and social group affinities. The Arab Street has been more bark than bite 
until the onset of the Arab Spring and the 25 January 2011 Egyptian Revolution. 
The spirit and memory of both the martyred Tunisian Mohamed Buoazizi and Egyptian 
Khaled Mohamed Saeed inspired Egyptians (and other Arabs throughout the Middle East) to rise 
up in protest. Buoazizi was a young fruit vendor who, after being brutalized by local police and 
unable to earn a living, resorted to the ultimate act of protest: self-immolation. Saeed was an 
Egyptian youth who was senselessly beaten to death by Egyptian police. A portrait photo 
contrasted with a brutal post-mortem photo of Saeed’s battered and bleeding face caused such an 
outrage that he is considered to be the face that launched the Egyptian Revolution and the protest 
movement “We are all Khaled Saeed” (“Khaled Saeed on…”, 2011). Tens of thousands of 
protestors gathered in Cairo. The protests were largely non-violent. Thousands of protestors 
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demonstrated in other major cities outside of Cairo. Social media and cell phones allowed 
demonstrators to self-organize and demonstrations to metastasize unpredictably and adaptively, 
overcoming government attempts to block access routes and communications.  
Mubarak's Egypt had the trappings of democracy, but the substance was dictatorship. 
Even with dictatorial powers, however, the government was unable to quell the protests. The 
police and security apparatus, although unconstrained and unaccountable, well equipped with the 
latest technology, and with the reputation for brutality, was unable to stop protestors from 
flowing into Tahrir square. By the end of the day it was obvious to all (assisted by continuous 
media coverage by Al-Jazeera, Al-Arabiya and Western networks) that leaderless and 
spontaneous dissent had become a national uprising against the Mubarak regime. The Arab 
dictator's nightmare had become real: a true revolution -- sudden overthrow of the regime driven 
by massive popular protest (Mandel, 2003).  
The Protestors 
Over the course of the revolution in Egypt, protests involved millions of people and 
eventually achieved widespread support among the Egyptian population as a whole. The largest 
street protests occurred over an 18-day period, culminating in Mubarak's resignation. The change 
of regime was accompanied by lifting emergency rule and other fundamental reforms. At the 
onset, however, the active protestors ("the Arab Street") were the vanguard, i.e., the Egyptians 
who initiated, mobilized, and actually manned the barricades of revolution. These were also the 
Egyptians who largely paid the price of revolution: police brutality, arrest, torture, and at least 
840 deaths (Mungin, 2011).  Protestors ranged across the socio-economic spectrum, diverse in 
age, gender, education, and profession. However, it is clear that those protestors most actively 
using social media and public demonstrations tended to be young, educated and tech-savvy. 
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Interestingly for a traditional Islamic culture, there were many female protestors. Photographs 
and contemporaneous news coverage of the Egyptian Revolution show most protestors to be 
younger adults. Western media tended to focus on protestors who spoke English.  
After the initial flood of protests and Mubarak's resignation, the leaderless momentum of 
the Arab Street receded. In subsequent months ongoing reform and political negotiation were 
coopted by existing political entities and organizations. 
What Did the Protestors Say? 
The leaderless nature of the Egyptian revolution at the outset made it impossible to speak 
with one voice. Commentators in both the West and the Arab World seemed bemused by the 
lack of appointed leadership and often conflicting demands and angry voices. Amid the chaotic 
protests, however, most of the voices were singing in key. There were common themes and 
goals, which are evident from the voluminous media coverage of the protests: news stories, 
interviews, photographs, and comments to news articles, as well as other sources. 
A synthesis of media coverage of the protests during the initial 18-day period of massive 
street demonstrations which led to Mubarak's resignation includes the following recurring 
themes: freedom – opportunity – justice – jobs – accountability – independence from Mubarak 
and Western domination. 
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Political Outcomes 
 
Figure 7. Photograph appearing in Al-Jazeera on January 26, the day after major mass protests erupted in 
Egypt 
	  
The iconic photo published by Al-Jazeera (Figure 7) serves as a microcosm for the failure 
of Egypt's Arab Street to translate their ideas from a successful revolution into a lasting political 
mandate. There are only a few elements in the photograph which are likely to appeal to 
traditional Egyptians, such as the colors of the Egyptian flag and Arabic nationalist slogans. The 
metaphor of falling dominos are labeled as Arab dictators. Ordinary Egyptians are opposed to 
dictators. However, the rest of the photograph contains very little with which a traditional 
Egyptian would be able to affiliate or identify. In fact, there is much in the photograph which 
would be perceived as out-group values, even alien, to an ordinary Egyptian. The friction 
between perceived alienness of the educated youth who were the vanguard of the revolution, and 
traditional Egyptians holding traditional values, foredoomed the rebellious youth movement, 
with its Westernized ideals, to oblivion. For example, the adoption of the anonymous mask of 
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Guy Fawkes was inappropriate in several ways. Most obviously, the face is not Egyptian. To 
many Egyptians, the face is villainous and threatening. The use of a mask suggests that 
something is being hidden. Why would anyone hide something that is good, an ordinary 
Egyptian (unaware of the Guy Fawkes mask and its history) may wonder? The image of toppling 
dominos is likewise a metaphor which requires context. To a Westerner, the old Cold War 
political cliché of dominos (innocent victims) falling to Communist (the bad guys) aggression is 
familiar. To an ordinary Egyptian, the image may imply some sinister external (read: Western or 
Israeli) force at work. The expensive clothing is Western. In Egypt the pampered children of the 
rich wear such clothing. The subtext is that the rebels are waging a covert war among corrupt 
elites. This is out-group messaging, unlikely to win support of ordinary Egyptians. 
Taking the analysis one step deeper, it is possible to consider what linked associations 
might occur to an observer who took the time to spend a few minutes considering the 
photograph. Clearly, an internationalist theme is present (anonymity, Guy Fawkes, Western 
clothing, the implication that falling Arab regimes will be replaced with Western democracy). 
The designer Western clothes evoke the sense of a class divide. The article itself was published 
by Al-Jazeera, which, as all Arabs know, is headquartered in Qatar, one of the Gulf Arab states. 
Ordinary Egyptians often resent Gulf Arabs as rich, selfish, stuck-up and hypocritical. The image 
of the protestor evokes a college student, one with well-to-do parents. Clearly, the message of the 
photograph is a call to revolution, to struggle. This is unnerving, especially considering the 
identity of the rebel is hidden, as are the identity of his backers and the goals (other than struggle 
and revolution against dictators). 
The overall impact of the photograph is out-group messaging. Alienness. The symbolism 
and subtext is dark and threatening, and unfamiliar to the traditional Egyptian unversed in 
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Western culture. Zaller (1992) points out that cueing messaging works best for those with a 
greater "level of cognitive engagement with an issue." In other words, preaching is most 
effective when preaching to those already converted. Educated, Westernized Egyptian youth who 
use Western jargon and concepts of democracy and freedom of speech symbolism (Guy Fawkes) 
were unlikely to have their message received favorably by those outside of their own relatively 
small in-group. The average Egyptian would find both subtext and symbolism uncomfortable. 
This photograph undoubtedly (and perhaps intentionally) inaccurately portrays the protestors, but 
it is likely an accurate view of how much of the Egyptian population viewed the protestors and 
their leaders. 
Although the introduction of Westernized values by protestors failed to be fully embraced 
by traditional Egyptians, some researchers suggest that there may have been "a shift in the 
attention span of young Muslim activists from violence to the nuts and bolts of realpolitik." This 
resulted in a fusion of the narratives of political Islam and secular democratic ideals (Moaddel, 
n.d.). 
Social Identity Theory helps explain how the vanguard of the Arab Street never 
established firm support in Egypt's political structure. The young neoliberal democrats appeared 
to violate the norms of traditional Egyptian society and religion in a number of ways, most 
obviously by flaunting Western out-group norms. 
 Contrastingly, the success of the Muslim Brotherhood's narrative stands out: "For the first 
time in my life I feel we have elected a leader through our own free will," said Mustafa Abu 
Hanafi, 31, a computer engineer, from Mansouria, Giza. "When someone graduates he's 
supposed to have a job. I haven't been able to find one. You always needed wasta (connections). 
Under Mursi (sic) this will change ... He's one of us" (Lyon, 2012). This implies that support by 
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traditional Egyptians for trusted institutions and organizations such as the Muslim Brotherhood is 
likely to be much more stable than for mysterious entities and personages such as protesters and 
their leaders. This also implies that many Egyptians who were not already knowledgeable on 
political issues, but who became caught up in the fervor of the revolution, would not have much 
staying power in continuing to support protestors as a persistent political movement.  
The perception in Egypt that protestors were supported or manipulated by foreign forces 
undermined popular support. Public opinion in Egypt is overwhelmingly critical of the West in 
general, and of the U.S. in particular. For example, in a May 8, 2012 Pew poll, 70% view the 
U.S. negatively (views of the United States and Israel). 
As of this writing, it appears that the protestors Western-oriented narratives of democracy 
and freedom have failed to gain traction in Egypt: 
The widespread use of ‘Arab Spring’ helped conceal this reality. The term 
brought to mind the changes that had swept through Eastern Europe with the 
collapse of the Soviet Union. Numerous, but inaccurate, parallels were drawn 
between the Eastern Bloc and the Middle East. These false premises were 
reinforced by the tens if not hundreds of thousands bright, young, articulate, 
Western-oriented, media-savvy demonstrators who rose against Arab nationalist 
governments. Despite the attention given to them, these youthful demonstrators 
never represented more than a small minority of the population. The fabric of 
Middle Eastern society has fundamentally changed. Being Muslim has replaced 
being Arab as the primary identifying factor. The consequences are profound.  
(Bannerman, 2012)  
The Muslim Brotherhood 
The Muslim Brothers began as a movement for the reform of individual and 
social morality, based on an analysis of what was wrong with Muslim societies, 
similar to, and in part derived from, that of the Salafiyya [first Islamic 
generation]. Islam, it believed, had declined because of the prevalence of a spirit 
of blind imitation and the coming in of the excesses of Sufism [Islamic 
mysticism]; to these had been added the influence of the West, which, in spite of 
its social virtues, had brought alien values, immorality, missionary activity and 
imperial domination. The beginning of a cure was for Muslims to return to the 
true Islam, that of the Qur'an as interpreted by genuine ijtihad [authorities on 
Islam], and to try to follow its teachings in every sphere of life. (Hourani, 1991) 
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The Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt prior to the Arab Spring was an illegal group which 
the Mubarak regime nevertheless tolerated for over three decades. It emerged from the tumult of 
the Egyptian Revolution as the political victors in an unstable and polarized political scene. Up 
until the recent coup the Muslim Brotherhood had won the majority of seats within the Shura 
council (upper parliament) and a Brotherhood member had ascended to the highest position 
within the Egyptian government, that of president. Ironically, former President Mubarak 
languishes in Tora prison, the same prison which has seen numerous important Brotherhood 
members spend time behind bars, including Seyyid Qutb, who composed “Milestones” during 
his ten-year incarceration there under then President Gamal Nasser.  
This belies the relatively humble beginnings of the Muslim Brotherhood (sometimes 
referred to as the Society for Muslim Brothers), founded in 1928 by Hassan El-Banna, a school 
teacher in the port city of Ismailia. Originally begun as a social organization to promote Islamic 
values and morals, the tenor of the organization changed after El-Banna witnessed the colonial 
brutalities inflicted upon Egyptians by the British, as well as the excesses of their indulgent 
Western lifestyles. Inspired by these experiences, he sought to create an anti-colonial group 
whose members and ideology would be guided by Islam to slough off the yoke of Britain. 
Originating in the governorate of Ismailia, the Muslim Brotherhood was formed in a time when 
anti-colonialist/imperialist sentiment was at an all time high and a desire to recapture 
nationalistic pride was strong (Mitchell, 1993). The Brotherhood was also a party that 
represented opposition to the authoritarian regimes of King Farouk, Gamal Abdul Nasser, Anwar 
Sadat, and Hosni Mubarak, though the Brotherhood opportunistically allied with them as well 
(Mitchell, 1993). The long lifespan of the Muslim Brotherhood, despite hostile governments and 
changing socio-political conditions, stems from pragmatism, patience and opportunism. It is 
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chameleonic in nature and displays an ability to shift alliances when necessary that have allowed 
it to remain relevant in Egyptian society when other groups have faded into obscurity and 
insignificance (Mitchell, 1993). 
From the outset, the Muslim Brotherhood has invested heavily in social programs and 
ideas of Islamic charity and welfare at the grassroots level. By late 1939 Muslim Brotherhood 
membership had spread to every governorate in Egypt and numbered over 500,000. In 2010 the 
Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood had between 2 and 2.5 million members (“No One Knows…”, 
2010), or about 4% of the population; since the revolution numbers may have increased  
substantially. The Muslim Brotherhood has demonstrated great organizational savvy and has a 
long and well known history of providing Islamic guidance, stipends, food, health care and other 
social welfare services to Egypt’s needy. Muslim Brothers are (or were, at least) widely 
perceived to be devout, honest men dedicated to serving the public good. This is the 
compassionate basis of the Muslim Brotherhood’s most compelling narrative and gave them 
instant credibility among many Egyptians as they decided to enter the fray of the Egyptian 
Revolution, albeit as latecomers. 
 While the Tunisian Revolution and the overthrow of the Bin Ali regime was of obvious 
concern to the Mubarak establishment, the revolution was also a threat to the influence and 
authority of the Muslim Brotherhood and Islamist religious groups throughout the Arab world. 
Prior to the Arab Spring the framing of fundamentalist Islamic religious groups was to cast 
themselves as one of the only lines of defense against authoritarian regimes and the only true 
alternative for change. In this capacity, as political outsiders, Islamist groups like the Egyptian 
Muslim Brotherhood were successful in sustaining moral legitimacy and popular support for 
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their cause, marshaling opposition to authoritarian regimes and promoting principled stances on 
issues.  
From a historical perspective the Arab Spring demonstrates the failure of Islamist groups 
to offer a narrative compelling enough to motivate people to undertake Islamic Revolution à la 
1979 Iran. Protestors did not rise up against entrenched governments under the banner of Islam, 
the Muslim Umma, or any Islamist group (Olivier, 2012). Rather, people protested against long-
standing regimes, calling for social justice, human rights and respect. Citizens claimed “their 
right to publicly express their rejection of the status quo” (Tadroz quoting El Erian, 2012). For 
Islamic groups that had for so long used the threatening shadow of oppressive regimes as 
political and social currency and the narrative of Islamic revolution, the success of the youth-led 
liberal democratic secular protest movement in Tunisia was both shocking in speed and 
unsettling in implication. To the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood, as a political, social, and 
religious organization whose foundational ideological narrative is that Islam is the only ultimate 
salvation for mankind, the un-Islamic narrative of the Tunisian Arab Spring must have been a 
disconcerting harbinger.5  
Initial Response 
The initial response of the Muslim Brotherhood in the wake of the Tunisian Revolution 
but prior to the 25 January 2011 protest was two-fold. While supporting the rebellion of the 
Tunisian street as a justified uprising against oppression and injustice, the Brotherhood took a 
different tack for Egypt, calling for reform, “stability, and social harmony” (Tadroz, 2012) rather 
than transformation via revolution. It was widely believed at the time that the Muslim 
Brotherhood was working with the Mubarak Regime to contain and minimize the ferment of the 
Arab Spring in Egypt. A 19 January press statement from the Brotherhood states, “immediate 
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reform is necessary if Egypt is not to follow suit in Tunisia’s historical uprising” (“MB’s 
Statement…”, 2011). This statement framed the Tunisian Revolution in a negative context. It 
was clear the Brotherhood opposed overthrowing Mubarak, supported the status quo and was 
calling for modest changes to the existing constitution, as well as a call to repeal the 30-year-old 
emergency law, along with other demands: 
We believe that the constitutional struggle in the natural course of political, 
economic, social, and community reform. We, the Muslim Brotherhood, are an 
integral part of this nation, we observe accurately and realistically the other party 
and the existing system in the country which owns [sic], which has the ability to 
reform and change more than anyone else if it had the will and desire to do so.  
(19 January 2011 Muslim Brotherhood Statement) 
 Of interest in the statement above: while the Brotherhood recognized the National 
Democratic Party and the Mubarak governmental machine, the Brotherhood had never been 
officially recognized by the regime and was colloquially referred to as “the outlawed” (Tadroz, 
2012). The Brotherhood hedged its bets; the idea that revolutionary furor would in less than three 
weeks depose Mubarak was unthinkable at this point in time. The historical memory of the brutal 
crackdowns by Farouk, Nasser and Mubarak in response to Muslim Brotherhood activism 
accounts partially for this call to restraint versus revolution. Although the political wing of the 
Muslim Brotherhood was an illegal organization, it nevertheless quietly co-existed with the 
Mubarak Regime, having made deals with the regime in the past to stay out of politics and not 
rock the boat (Tadroz, 2012). The Brotherhood was loathe to make bets on a revolution that 
might fail and to have to endure the ferocious blowback of an angered dictator. Slackman (2011) 
mentions similar threats by Egyptian state security warning Brotherhood members against 
participation in any protests movements borne from the events in Tunisia. 
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 In addition to being pragmatic and risk averse, there was an ideological motivation for 
the Brotherhood’s hesitation to enter into any movement for revolutionary change, according to 
Tadroz (p31). Gom’a Amin, a noted Brotherhood historian and advisor, said:  
The Muslim Brotherhood does not believe in advocacy through acts of civil 
disobedience, policy change, demonstrations and hunger strikes as a means 
through which to elicit reform. Such tactics fail when faced with dictatorial rule, 
and the Muslim Brotherhood’s approach instead is based on a holistic approach to 
deepening Islamic values in society through da’wa, Islamic pedagogy and 
education. (Tadroz quoting Amin, 2007) 
 
This illustrates a long-standing schizophrenic tendency within the Muslim Brotherhood; 
one wing favored strong political action while the other focused on withdrawing from the 
political arena and instead concentrating on religious studies and social welfare work. The 
history of the Muslim Brotherhood is rife with periods of advocacy through civil disobedience 
and protests that are confirmed by official statements in the past by the Muslim Brotherhood 
calling for civil disobedience (“Egypt’s Muslim…”, 2007). While Amin may be advocating a 
lesser political role, it is also possible that the statement is intended to allay the fears of an ever-
suspicious Mubarak Regime. 
25 January 2011 
The announcement that the 25 January 2011 Police Day would instead be a protest day 
by liberal democratic groups like the April 6th Movement was met with silence by the Muslim 
Brotherhood. Only two days prior to the protests the Muslim Brotherhood, via its official 
website, was still undecided as to the role it would play in the 25 January protests and was still 
“engaged in internal discussions” (“MB To Announce…”, 2011). However, other sources 
suggest that the Muslim Brotherhood had already made a decision to not participate in the 
protests. Supreme Guidance Council Leader for the organization Dr. Essam el-Erian was quoted 
as saying “We should all be celebrating together” (Slackman, 2011). This statement was clearly 
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intended to suggest that the proper course of conduct was for the entire nation, including the 
Mubarak Regime, to join together and peacefully and joyfully celebrate National Police Day. 
Statements like this would return to damage the narrative and erode the credibility of the Muslim 
Brotherhood in the days after the Egyptian Revolution as elements of their organization 
attempted to recast the Muslim Brotherhood’s wariness to enter protests in a different, more 
affirmative light. 
 As it became clear that the demonstrations were gaining widespread support, the Muslim 
Brotherhood dived headlong into the fray. Clearly, it made an opportunistic calculation that the 
demonstrations were about to achieve escape velocity and it feared being left behind. Another 
illustration of the rubbery nature of the Muslim Brotherhood’s narrative, a 2013 book by Amer 
Shammakh, The Muslim Brotherhood And The Revolution Of 25 January, in a clear rewriting of 
history, repaints the Muslim Brothers as the vanguard and backbone of the Revolution 
(Mahmoud, 2013) serving on the front lines from day one and acting as a calmative element 
among restless and potentially violent protestors. 
 Once the full weight of the Muslim Brotherhood machine had been thrown behind the 
Revolution, local chapters all throughout Egypt sprung into action. Their strong organizational 
presence and manpower, along with a skilled cadre of Brothers experienced in protest (Tadroz, 
2012), quickly exposed the weaknesses of the leaderless secular democratic youth protest 
movement. The advantage of leaderless mass protests is that they cannot easily be defanged or 
defused in one fell swoop by neutralizing a protest leader (Castells, 2004). However, while 
unorganized protest movements can exert immense momentum for change at a specific point in 
time, they often lack persistence, that is, they tend to fragment and disperse. Leaderless 
movements are vulnerable to appropriation by more experienced and ruthless operators. 
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“Revolutionary movements lacking a vanguard are crushed by more entrenched and better-
organized forces in the aftermath of massive social and political upheaval” (Bradley, 2012). In 
contrast, it is difficult for an ephemeral protest movement to create a sustainable presence. This 
is exactly what transpired as the Muslim Brotherhood’s superior organization, management and 
funds allowed them to quickly pirate the voice of the Revolution over the leaderless and 
fragmented secular democratic youth.  
In The Days After 
 Tadroz (2012) recounts that in the days following the ouster of Mubarak, the Muslim 
Brotherhood was able to dominate Tahrir Square. It controlled access to the square via choke 
points manned by Brothers, erected an elevated stage in a prime location, set up massive 
speakers and multimedia arrays and literally drowned out the voices of other protest groups, who 
were the original vanguard of the movement, as they vainly attempted to compete with paper 
signs, shouts, the occasional megaphone, and frantic flag waving. This precedent set by the 
Muslim Brotherhood in the early days after Mubarak’s departure continued to grow stronger, and 
with few exceptions the Brotherhood’s narrative remained dominant up until the moment it 
captured the Egyptian Presidency. 
 Attempts to coalesce political opposition against the Muslim Brotherhood had met with 
limited success until the most recent 30 June protests. In response to the President’s dictatorial 
constitutional edicts of 22 November 2012, the National Salvation Front was formed. Led by 
Nobel laureate Mohammed El Baradei and former presidential candidates Amr Moussa and 
Hamdeen Sabahi, the National Salvation Front has framed itself as the de-facto opposition 
umbrella group to President Morsi and the Muslim Brotherhood. During a November power 
grab, when President Morsi bestowed upon himself sweeping and unrestricted executive powers 
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by rendering impotent the Egyptian judiciary branch and circumventing the system of checks and 
balances (Hume, 2012), El-Baradei tweeted "(They) are currently staging a coup against 
democracy...regime legitimacy fast eroding," (Spencer, 2012). The Muslim Brotherhood reaction 
was to paint El-Baradei as a Westerner. “We’re not scared of El-Baradei, he has no real support 
on the street, he’s Western” (Rohde, 2012). 
By framing El-Baradei as "Western," the Muslim Brotherhood is attempting to tar its 
opponent as un-Egyptian without ever having to prove any factual charges, defend its own 
conduct or even make any specific accusations, because aspects of Western culture and foreign 
policy are hugely unpopular in Egypt and the Arab world. The not-so-subtle implication is that 
the largely young, educated, often English-speaking Egyptians who took the streets against 
Mubarak and actually initiated the Revolution are “useful idiots” -- tools of America and Europe 
acting as foolish pawns, or even a traitorous Fifth Column manipulated by the West. There are a 
number of connotations to this descriptor: exploitive, colonial, conspiracy, rapacious, war, 
consumerism, anti-Islam and support of Israel among them. This is one of the fundamental 
frames that the Muslim Brotherhood invokes against the liberal opposition. 
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Figure 8. One of numerous posters comparing President Morsi to Former President Mubarak. The Arabic 
reads "Mohammed Morsi Mubarak"  
	  
Contrastingly, the liberal opposition frames this current struggle as Mubarak part deux or 
the rise of a “new Pharaoh” (Hendawi, 2012), referring to Mubarak’s failed attempts to cast 
himself as a modern day Pharaoh of Egypt (Fein, 2011). This is powerful framing because the 
memory of the Mubarak dictatorship is still fresh in everyone's minds, mindful of the Egyptian 
historical cycle of revolution and liberation, followed by the imposition of authoritarianism in the 
name of a temporary emergency, which remains in place indefinitely. 
The Muslim Brotherhood, up until the present time, has always been a party in 
opposition, the out-group. Its history of inconsistent behavior, policies, alliances and narrative 
has never before been at the forefront of public attention. However, when it became a ruling 
party, these continuing inconsistencies entered the spotlight and it failed to adapt its narrative in 
a meaningful way to address these issues. As an opposition party for almost a century and an 
outsider group that never had to worry about governing a country or reconciling past 
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contradictory and inflammatory statements made by its leaders, it never had to face the reality of 
trying to implement an Islamic State in a diverse modern world. 
It is clear that although the Muslim Brotherhood “won” the battle of narratives during the 
phase of the revolution leading up to presidential and parliamentary elections, it failed to adapt 
the narrative in the aftermath. It attempted, with only partial success, to inherit institutions from 
the former regime rather than rebuilding them. The state media, other agencies and the police by 
way of the Interior Ministry were all to varying degrees seized by the Muslim Brotherhood. 
However, it was unable to capture control of the judiciary, the police as a whole, and the Army. 
It is reasonable to assume that the Muslim Brotherhood would have continued in its attempts to 
seize these institutions as well, were it not for the coup.  
The narrative used during the election campaign of opposition to dictatorship and service 
to the poor was a narrative that was highly credible. That narrative carried with it a built-in 
expiration date, however, which was the moment that the Muslim Brotherhood assumed power 
and responsibility for the governance of Egypt and all Egyptians. The post-election narratives 
offered by the Muslim Brotherhood in the aftermath of its election triumphs have been 
contradictory, incoherent, and partisan. Rather than working to widen consensus to attract a 
broader constituency and changing institutions to be more inclusive, it instead retained its narrow 
constituencies and inherited many institutions of the Mubarak regime. This bifurcated the 
population and eroded the Brotherhood’s legitimacy. 
Upon the election of a Muslim Brotherhood President, the Muslim Brotherhood sought to 
allay the fears of a looming Islamic State modeled on Saudi Arabia, espousing a narrative of 
moderation, an environment of inclusiveness, religious tolerance and democratic plurality. These 
promises have not translated into action and its actions have conflicted with its narrative. There 
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is an essential contradiction that is inherent in the fundamental nature and goals of the Muslim 
Brotherhood. Its narrative is fundamentally, and inherently, schizophrenic. One leg is planted in 
the time of the Prophet and another leg stands in the modern world. It was becoming increasingly 
difficult for the Muslim Brotherhood to rationalize its opportunistic and ad hoc behavior. A 
once-credible but now unsuitable narrative, coupled with a context that includes an economy in 
free fall, continuing social justice issues, and rampant corruption, all led to the Muslim 
Brotherhood's eventual ouster. 
“This never-ending struggle between the ideal world of the community of brotherly love 
and the brutal reality of everyday life has been the principal religious leverage towards social 
change in human societies” (Turner, 2010). This is a powerful and universal human narrative. 
Like other revelatory religions, Islam promises a better world in lieu of the Hobbesian dystopian 
vision of brutality, injustice, tooth, and claw, which is apparent and inescapable in the real world. 
“Islam is the Solution” is the often used slogan of the Muslim Brotherhood.  
The Muslim Brotherhood holds that if people were to conduct themselves as the Prophet, 
his disciple Abu Bakr (Sunni Islam) and his followers did in the time of ancient Medina and 
Mecca, a godly peace would be achieved. However, the behavior of the Muslim Brotherhood as 
an organization, as well as the conduct of its individual leaders, undermines the credibility of its 
fundamentalist narrative. Since the Qur’an forbids charging interest on loans, the Muslim 
Brotherhood and other fundamentalist organizations have set up parallel systems of Islamic 
banking in accord with Islamic principles; however, the Muslim Brotherhood is integrated with 
and participates in the Western banking system to further its own goals (“Secrets of…”, 2013). A 
revealing example of the gap between fundamentalist ideology and actual conduct is the expose 
by the Al-Arabiya channel showing that the Muslim Brotherhood retains tens of millions of 
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dollars within secret Swiss bank accounts (“Secrets of…”, 2013). There are other examples of 
inconsistencies between narrative and actual behavior, the Muslim Brotherhood (by way of its 
Freedom And Justice Party) officially condemns nepotism (“FJP 2011 Program…”, 2011). 
However, high ranking Muslim Brotherhood leaders like former President Morsi routinely 
practice it (“Another Mask Falls…”, 2013).  
The Muslim Brotherhood, like other fundamentalist religious organizations, believes in 
the inerrancy of scripture. Since God’s words cannot be changed, mere humans are left with the 
task of proper interpretation. Only interpretation and increasingly tenuous reinterpretation can be 
made to adapt to the modern world (Turner, 2010), which has radically different notions of 
human rights and morality than those that were prevalent in the Middle East 1400 years ago. 
Many of the rights enshrined in the UN Declaration of Human Rights would be unacceptable to 
the Prophet and the people of his time. The failure to reasonably adapt to the morals, science, and 
technology of the modern world not only challenges the appeal of the Muslim Brotherhood, but 
also undermines its image of fairness and competency to rule, in other words its legitimacy. For 
example, former Egyptian Minister of Health Hesham Kandil, an appointee of the Muslim 
Brotherhood, triggered a furor of protests and accusations of elitism and patriarchalism among 
rights activists when he suggested that the cause of poor infant health in rural Egypt was 
unhygienic female breasts (“Kandil’s Suggestion …”, 2013), and that rural women are raped in 
fields as they do not wash in the mosque as men do (“Egypt News: Kandil…”, 2013).  
Further, the Arab Spring has triggered a resurgence in the feminist movement. Women 
served at the frontline during the Tunisian and Egyptian Revolutions—marching, protesting, and 
dying with their male counterparts in the pursuit of social justice and freedom from oppression. 
With the dissolution of authoritarian regimes, newly drafted constitutions and laws to instill 
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egalitarian ideals and women serving in legislatures, the future for women’s rights looked bright. 
Unfortunately, fundamentalist organizations run by “men stuck in the seventh century” 
(Eltahawy, 2012) continue to present a hurdle for women’s equality in the Middle East, as these 
men consider it a direct attack on the patriarchal family concept. During the Egyptian elections 
Islamists from the Al-Nour party replaced the portrait photo of female candidate Marwa Ibrahim 
Al-Qamash with a flower, Islamists in Alexandria robed the nude carvings of mermaids, and 
some Islamist members refused to be interviewed by females without a head covering or were 
unwilling to be in the same room as the female interviewer. In response, female equality groups 
like the “FEMENS” have begun to surface. Egyptian blogger, feminist, atheist and FEMEN 
Aliaa Magda Elmahdy and others have moved to protesting the Islamic fundamentalism 
enveloping Egypt through nude protests covering her “unholy” parts with the “holy book.” The 
narrative put forth by the Muslim Brotherhood does not offer satisfactory or reasonable answers 
to demands put forth by modern day feminists.  
 
Figure 9. Aliaa Magda El-Mahdy, Blogger, Activist, and Feminist protests Morsi and Shari'a law in front of 
the Egyptian Embassy in Stockholm, Denmark 
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Another example illustrating the challenges of modernity facing the Muslim Brotherhood 
is a movement in Egypt to eliminate religion from the Egyptian national identity card. The 
“None of Your Business” campaign seeks to obscure religious affiliations/identities on Egyptian 
national identity cards with stickers that replace Muslim, Christian or Jewish affiliation with 
“human” or the pithy “None of Your Business.” In the Prophet’s time religion was not a matter 
of “affiliation,” but rather a matter of being born or forcibly converted into one, often a matter 
life or death. Fundamentalist Islam involves reverting to a pure form of Islam, Islam as it was 
during the time of the Prophet Mohammed. The Qur’an was fully composed in the 7th century, 
but the Muslim Brotherhood in the 21st century struggles to reconcile it with modern ideas of 
religious freedom and society. Morsi was obviously aware of these concerns and had publicly 
emphasized tolerance and inclusiveness, both prior to his election as president and afterwards, 
assuring Copts, Egypt’s Christian minority, and other minority religious groups that they would 
remain part of the fabric of the Egyptian nation (Malah, 2012). However, he was promptly 
confronted with a slew of YouTube videos from his earlier career as a Muslim Brotherhood 
apparatchik giving passionate speeches damning Jews as the descendants of apes and pigs 
(“Morsi Describes…”, 2013). Since the elections there were numerous reports of Muslim 
Brotherhood members showing intolerance of other religions, particularly the Copts. The 
Muslim Brotherhood wore whatever face it needed for political advantage, but the disconnect 
between what it was saying and what was really happening in Egypt was indefensible and readily 
apparent to even the most aloof Egyptian. 
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Figure 10. A "None of Your Business" sticker obscures the religion field on an Egyptian national identity 
card 
 
Up until their ouster by the military, little progress had been made by the Muslim 
Brotherhood to resolve these challenges. Increasingly, Egyptians saw its narrative of inclusion 
and tolerance as insincere lip service, and the framing of the Muslim Brotherhood as a viable 
political-religious entity has now been cut short.  
CONCLUSION 
This study addressed the question of whether or not narrative was an important factor in 
the rise and fall of the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt during the Egyptian Revolution, beginning 
on 25 January 2011 to the military coup on 3 July 2013. The answer is that it was an important 
part, but not the only factor. Other factors such as social identity and inherited institutions also 
played a significant role in contributing to both the success and failure of the Egyptian Muslim 
Brotherhood.   
Looking at the revolution in hindsight, it is clear that the electoral victories of the Muslim 
Brotherhood were highly predictable. The most important factor in its meteoric rise to power was 
its pre-existing and very capable organizational presence, giving it “boots on the ground” 
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throughout Egypt. Second to this was a powerful history and narrative based on a long history of 
social welfare and opposition to tyranny. The third factor was credibility; in this case the long 
history of the organization was known to everyone in Egypt.  
The Egyptian Revolution shows that the effectiveness of narrative can be highly variable, 
based on time and context. When the context changes, narrative must adapt. An attractive but 
unauthentic narrative may be able to mask structural problems in the short run, but not over a 
long span of time. For example, the narrative of altruism that served the Muslim Brotherhood so 
well in the pre-election phase was no longer credible after the Muslim Brotherhood ascended to 
power in the post-election phase. In fact, changing circumstances which conflict with previous 
narratives seriously undermined its popularity. The Brotherhood is a classic example of 
victorious revolutionaries failing to adapt pre-revolutionary narrative to the changed context of 
having the responsibility to represent all groups in society rather than just loyalists. 
The immediate cause of the Muslim Brotherhood’s fall from power was a coup, an 
intervention by the Egyptian Army. The coup was enabled by widespread public dissatisfaction 
with the Brotherhood and massive public protests against the Morsi regime. It seems clear that 
the Brotherhood missed many opportunities to be more inclusive and accommodating to other 
elements of Egyptian society. President Morsi himself acknowledged his regret for issuing 
himself sweeping constitutional powers. External factors such as deteriorating economic 
conditions and austerity measures taken to satisfy the International Monetary Fund in order to 
obtain loans imposed serious constraints on Morsi's freedom of action. The Muslim Brotherhood 
made arrogant and needless mistakes that undermined its support and credibility. Its narrative 
appealed to fewer and fewer Egyptians as time passed. Had the Muslim Brotherhood adapted its 
narrative and truly embraced more inclusive and tolerant policies, the protest movement against 
 
	   52	  
it would undoubtedly have been less powerful. There would have been fewer protestors, and the 
Army may never have been given the green light it needed to intervene. In short, the Muslim 
Brotherhood failed to create a legitimate post-revolutionary narrative that unified Egypt. It had 
sufficient numbers of supporters to win the presidential elections, but too few supporters to 
maintain legitimacy and defend it against a coup. At the beginning of the Egyptian Revolution a 
narrative of justice drove unprecedented numbers of ordinary Egyptians onto the streets to 
protest the Mubarak dictatorship and carry the Muslim Brotherhood to power. One year later, 
once again ordinary Egyptians flooded the streets of Cairo, Alexandria and other cities of Egypt -
- but this time to bury Caesar, not to praise him.  
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1 Fall 2012 Panel discussion at KU: “Egypt 2013: Uncovering Misconceptions about the Muslim Brotherhood, anti-Islam Video, and Post-
Revolution Changes” with Adham Hashish, Dr. Jaqueline Brinton, Marwa Ghazali 28 November 2012 
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